Legal Systems Lab

Explore how rule complexity, enforcement, trust, culture, and stability interact to shape compliance, rights protection, and reform. Mobile friendly and free to use.

Inputs

40
70
65
60
70

Presets

Model sketch for teaching. Relationships draw on published work in enforcement, norms, rule design, and legal evolution. Open the Sources below for details.
Sources used in the model

Rule complexity and compliance: L. Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 11(1) 1995.

Enforcement and deterrence: G. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Journal of Political Economy 76(2) 1968; A. M. Polinsky & S. Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, Journal of Economic Literature 38(1) 2000.

Trust and voluntary compliance: T. R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, Princeton University Press 2006.

Law–norms alignment: R. C. Ellickson, Order without Law, Harvard University Press 1991; E. A. Posner, Law and Social Norms, Harvard University Press 2000.

Legal evolution and feedback: G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System, Blackwell 1993; G. K. Hadfield & B. R. Weingast, What is Law? Journal of Legal Analysis 4(2) 2012.

Political stability and trust: F. Fukuyama, Trust, Free Press 1995.

Tip: Balanced complexity often sustains higher compliance than extremes.
All values are 0 to 100

Outcomes

Compliance rate

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Rights protection

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Law reform rate

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Rule of law score

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Rule of law score is a composite of compliance, rights, and stability. Law reform rate rises with misalignment and instability. Compliance follows an inverted U with respect to rule complexity, adjusted by enforcement, trust, and culture.

Info

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